Abstract. Ascribing causality amounts to determining what elements in a sequence of reported facts can be related in a causal way, on the basis of some knowledge about the course of the world. The paper offers a comparison of a large span of formal models (based on structural equations, non-monotonic consequence relations, trajectory preference relations, identification of violated norms, graphical representations, or connectionism), using a running example taken from a corpus of car accident reports. Interestingly enough, the compared approaches focus on different aspects of the problem by either identifying all the potential causes, or selecting a smaller subset by taking advantages of contextually abnormal facts, or by modeling interventions to get rid of simple correlations. The paper concludes by a general discussion based on a battery of criteria (several of them being proper to AI approaches to causality).
Introduction
Causality is a protean and complex notion. Accordingly, multiple models of causation were developed in Artificial Intelligence (AI). Indeed, the idea of causality pervades several important AI problems, e.g., in the diagnosis of the potential causes from observed effects; in the induction of causal laws from series of observations; in logics of action; in the qualitative simulation of dynamical systems (when propagating constraints in influence graphs).
In this article, we focus on the perception of causal relations and causal ascription. Unsurprisingly, models proposed for causal ascription generally agree in some way with the idea of relating causality to counterfactuality: the counterfactual 'Had A not taken place, B would not have occurred' sounds as a necessary condition for declaring that A causes B. This idea underlies many approaches, from that initiated in modal logic years ago [1] , to the approach more recently advocated by Pearl [2] in a probabilistic setting. However, as we will see, providing a full account of the way causality is perceived may also benefit from the identification of facts found 'abnormal' by agents in given contexts, among a series of reported events.
It is a daunting task to compare the definitions and properties of models of causal perception and ascription. A preliminary and useful step toward such an achievement, though, consists of illustrating the behavior of the models through a series of well-chosen examples. The examples should be realistic and relevant to the real world-but not so complex that they would no longer be manageable. They should strike the right balance between traditional, simplistic examples (the causal equivalents of the Tweety problem in default reasoning), and intractable scenarios such as the circumstances of Princess Diana's death. Traffic accidents reports offer an excellent source for such examples. They describe genuine events; they naturally lend themselves to causal analysis (in fact, they are often used for that very purpose); and they occur in a relatively self-contained micro-universe. We were able to gain access to a database of traffic accident reports submitted by drivers to insurance companies (the current sample consists of about one hundred reports of accidents that happened in France in recent years). We then submitted these reports to a battery of formal models (based on structural equations, nonmonotonic logics, graphs, or connectionism). Due to space limitations, we will restrict ourselves to one report:
Example 1 (Accident). We were at * * * , I was surprised by the person who braked in front of me, not having the option of changing lane and the road being wet, I could not stop completely in time.
All models will use the same common core of variables and pieces of knowledge. Variables are: Acc (occurrence of an accident), W et (road being wet), Brak (driver B brakes in front of driver A), Reac (driver A brakes in reaction to driver B's braking), with variants ReacS and ReacL (driver A brakes shortly after B brakes, or with a longer delay), N cl (A does not have the option of changing lane), Sur (A is surprised). Additional variables may be introduced in some models to display interesting variants of the example. Logical constraints exist among the variables: (1) Reac ≡ ReacS ∨ReacL, (2) ¬ReacS ∨¬ReacL, (3) ¬Reac ∨ Brak. The common core of knowledge is: (4) Accidents are abnormal, (5) Being surprised is abnormal, (6) ReacL and W et promote Acc, (7) Brak and N cl and Sur promote ReacL, (8) Brak and N cl and ¬Sur promote ReacS. Each model will incorporate this common core of knowledge, up to its representational specificities (especially regarding the formalization of what 'abnormal' and 'promote' mean). Again, additional pieces of knowledge may be introduced to highlight interesting aspects of the models. The presentation of each model will follow the same structure: brief motivation, reminder of definitions, summary of characteristic features, treatment of the example, discussion. Although the original purpose of this paper is to compare the models mainly on the basis of formal considerations, their discussion will occasionally point to experimental data, when they exist.
Structural Equations Model
Halpern and Pearl [3] propose a model allowing identification of 'actual causes.' The model distinguishes between 'endogenous' and 'exogenous' variables. Assigned values of endogenous variables are governed by structural equations, whereas exogenous variables are assumed to be known and out of control. Only endogenous variables can be causes or be caused. Background knowledge in such model is given by the context and structural equations. A causal model is denoted by M =(U, V, F ) where U and V are sets of exogenous and endogenous variables. F is a function that assigns a value to each variable given each value of its parents. Each assignment of the exogenous variables U = u determines a unique value x of each subset X of endogenous variables (i.e. X ⊆ V ). 
The subset X is minimal.
Pearl and Halpern also proposed an extended causal model to deal with excluded settings. The extended version of Definition 1 consists of adding to the tuple (U, V, F ) a set E that contains allowed settings of endogenous variables. E functions as some kind of integrity constraint. In our example, all settings are considered allowed, and the extended causal model collapses with Definition 1. The causal model described above can be represented using a graph, in which nodes are corresponding to variables in V and an edge from X to Y exists if the value of Y depends from the value of X. This graph is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) representing the relationships between variables which are fully specified by structural equations. . Thus condition 2b is also satisfied. It is obvious that N cl = 1 is minimal (condition 3). We conclude that N cl = 1 is a cause of Acc = 1. Maintaining the same context and setting W = w we obtain that each event is a cause of Acc = 1.
Discussion. Despite the fact that this model allows to handle notorious case studies on causality, it still presents some limitations. Reasoning with structural equations means that all required information must be available (this makes sense in some physics applications where structural equations reflects physical laws among a limited set of variables). Unfortunately, this is not always the case, which may limit the scope of application. For example, rules (4) and (5) in the introduction cannot be easily represented [4] , and using non-monotonic rules may be an interesting alternative. Besides, requiring that any assignment of exogenous variables uniquely determines the value of all endogenous variables is not always natural. The apparent lack of selective power of this model may also be considered a weakness, as an event is very easily designated as a cause of another. E.g., in our example, each event is a cause of Acc = 1. In order to select preferred causes, it may be interesting to assign 'weights' on the basis of levels of normality assigned to each cause according to its implication in making the event happening.
Nonmonotonic Logic Approaches
As discussed by philosophers of law [5] , and experimentally checked by psychologists,'abnormal' facts are privileged when providing causal explanations [6] . Added to the insufficiency of material implication for representing causation, this naturally leads to consider nonmonotonic logic-based approaches for causal ascriptions. Relations between nonmonotonic inference and causality have already been emphasized by authors dealing with reasoning about actions and the frame problem [7, 8] . 'Causal rules' are understood there as 'there is a cause for effect B to be true if it is true that A has just been executed,' where 'there is a cause for' is a modal operator. However, we are not interested in the following in the proper modeling of already established causality relations, but rather in the ascription of causality relations in a reported series of facts or events.
Nonmonotonic Consequence Approach
To reflect the fact that human agents cannot always couch their beliefs in precise probabilistic terms, Bonnefon et al. [9, 10] offer a qualitative counterpart to probabilistic conceptions of causality. This approach is based on pieces of default knowledge, and privileges the role of abnormal events in a given context. In the definitions of and , |∼ is a preferential entailment in the sense of Kraus et al. [11] , and a rational closure entailment, respectively. This definition has noticeable features. E.g., causes and facilitations are abnormal in context: If A B or A B then K |∼ ¬A. Furthermore, causality is transitive only in particular cases: If A is the normal way of getting B in context K, i.e., K ∧ B |∼ A, and if A B and B C, then A C. The practical significance of Def. 2 (including the distinction between causation and facilitation), as well as the restricted transitivity property, have been validated by behavioral experiments. Note that a facilitation is abnormal and is not a necessary condition for the effect, in contrast to an enabling condition (see below).
Example. The story that unfolds in the report reads: At any point in time, W et is true. Initially, N cl is true, and Acc, Brak, Reac, and Sur are false. Next, Brak and Sur become true. Next, ReacL becomes true. Finally, Acc becomes true. The formalization of the common core of knowledge is : (4) |∼ ¬Acc;
From (4) and (6), we derive ReacL ∧ W et Acc. The cause of the accident is the conjunction of braking late and the road being wet. Now let us consider a few additional plausible nonmonotonic rules. Assume that long-delay braking alone, although it does not make accidents normal, at least makes them not abnormal (ReacL |∼ Acc together with ReacL |∼ ¬Acc). Adding this assumption, we can derive ReacL Acc; i.e., the long-delay braking alone facilitated the accident (but the cause of the accident is still the conjunction of late braking and the road being wet). Assume now that late braking is abnormal (|∼ ¬ReacL), and remains so in the context of others braking, and being unable to change lane (Brak∧N cl |∼ ¬ReacL). Then it follows from (7) that being surprised caused the late braking (Sur ReacL). For the purpose of further illustration, let us assume that accidents remain abnormal even when roads are wet (W et |∼ ¬Acc). Then it is possible to derive than late braking alone caused the accident (ReacL Acc). Note now that Sur ReacL together with ReacL Acc. Surprise caused the late braking that itself caused the accident. Does it follow by transitivity that Sur Acc, i.e., that surprise caused the accident? Not necessarily so, for is not generally transitive. If, however, we are ready to accept that ReacL |∼ Sur, i.e., a late braking is usually diagnostic of a surprised driver, then it follows from the restricted transitivity property of that the surprise caused the accident. Finally, suppose that that we add to the story that some other car C hit B. Then, the nonmonotonic approach yields a disjunctive causal ascription 'car hitting OR late braking' caused the accident. Only a more detailed report may lead the approach to privilege one of the disjuncts.
Discussion. This approach relies on the beliefs about the 'normal' states and courses of the world. Such beliefs are agent-dependent, which explains that different individuals may have different readings of events. Since the inference engine based on System P is very cautious, many of these normal states must be explicitly coded rather than derived. Causality ascription is localized, thanks to a lack of general transitivity, but also because only events that are explicitly mentioned in the story can be detected as causes. Exceptional events are favored as potential causes, which help discriminating causes; in fact, the approach only exhibits causes that are abnormal events. A notion of 'necessary condition' (or enabling condition) [12] can be defined to deal with normal events without which nothing would have happened. Finally, this approach does not embed the notion of intervention and thus cannot readily distinguish spurious correlation from causation. See nonetheless the Graphical Models and Interventions section for an extension of the approach into that direction (both the current approach and graphical models can be encoded in a possibilistic setting).
Trajectory-Based Preference Relations
This proposal [13] 2 starts with the idea that counterfactuality involves the computation of two kinds of evolutions of the world, namely extrapolation [14] and update [15] . If we want to know whether Sur (2) (being surprised at time point 2) is a counterfactual cause of Acc (3) , given a scenario Σ (Brak (1) ∧ Sur (2) ∧ N cl (2) ∧ W et (2) ∧ Acc (3) ), we need to (i) compute the most normal evolutions of the world (called trajectories) that correspond to the scenario Sur (2) and Acc (3) . This computation is called extrapolation, it is a process of completing initial beliefs sets stemming from observations by assuming minimal 'abnormalities' in the evolution of the world with respect to generic knowledge. In our example, the preferred trajectories satisfying Σ do satisfy Sur (2) and Acc (3) (2) had not been true. This is done by updating the temporal formula representing the scenario by the formula ¬Sur (2) . At this step, update aims at capturing a minimal change w.r.t. the initial scenario. The update operator proposed in [13] is based on a distance between trajectories that take into account the time point of the change and normality. Here, the trajectories that satisfy ¬Sur (2) that are closest to the previous preferred trajectories until the time of the change and that are the most normal satisfy ¬Acc (3) . Hence the surprise can be considered as counterfactually causing the accident. One may consider that not all counterfactual causes are important; the lack of selectivity of counterfactuality is tackled here by using normality. Choosing among the 'normal' counterfactual causes, the most abnormal ones in context, would further increase selectivity.
Norm-Based Approach
This approach [16] , too, rests on the idea that norms are crucial for people to find causes of events: if the event is considered normal, its cause is the norm itself; if abnormal, its cause is traced back to the violation of a norm. Principle. Searching for the cause of an abnormal event E occurring at time t basically amounts to finding an agent who should, according to some norm, adopt behavior b at a time t < t, and actually adopted another behavior b , such that E appears as a normal consequence of b (in that sense, for example, the lack of liability insurance is a norm violation but cannot usually be considered the cause of an accident, because it arguably does not normally have an accident as a consequence). Another condition must be checked, namely that, at t , the agent had the possibility to have the normal behavior b; otherwise, b is only a derived anomaly and the search must be pursued to find a primary anomaly, occurring earlier than t and explaining the impossibility of the agent to have the behavior b at t . Whenever this search fails, i.e., when the privilege conferred to an 'interventionist' kind of cause gives no result, and only in this case, we look for some non agentive abnormal circumstance that could explain E.
Norm-based reasoning is intrinsically non monotonic, as norms are rules that apply by default. For this reason, in this approach, the knowledge necessary to causal ascription is expressed in a reified first-order logic augmented with default rules (in the sense of R. Reiter); the fact that property P holds for agent A at time t is written holds (P, A, t) . A discrete and linear model of time is sufficient, as only what really happened is represented. Two modalities are introduced to express norm violations: should(P, A, t) and able(P, A, t) standing for: at time t, A should (resp. has the ability to) achieve P .
Testing this approach in the domain of road accidents requires to gather all the literals of the form should(P, A, t) that are relevant for this domain. To this end, we examined 73 car-crash reports, used as a training sample among the 160 reports in our possession; the remainder being left for validation purposes. For the running example of this paper, we only need a few of these literals: By wet weather, one should reduce one's speed; having had an accident at time t entails that one had at time t − 1 the duty of avoiding some obstacle; and having this duty and being unable to change lane amounts to have the duty to stop. This is written (→ is the material implication):
(reduced speed, A, t) (2) holds(Acc, A, t) → should(avoid obs, A, t − 1) (3) should(avoid obs, A, t) ∧ ¬able(ch lane, A, t) → should(stop, A, t)
Expressed in this language, the cause of an abnormal event (the 'primary anomaly' P ano) obtains as:
(4) should(F, A, t) ∧ able(F, A, t) ∧ ¬holds(F, A, t + 1) → P ano(F, A, t + 1)
I.e., if at t an agent A should do F and was able to do F , while at t + 1, F failed to be done, this failure is the cause looked for. Similarly, a 'derived anomaly' D ano is detected by the rule:
(5) should(F, A, t) ∧ ¬able(F, A, t) → D ano(F, A, t)
Assume as a default that agents having a duty are generally able to comply with it. Exceptions to this default mostly correspond to cases where the situation allows to prove the impossibility of actions known to produce the desired effect.
Example. With the notations adopted in this paper, the example is written: holds(Brak, B, 0), holds(Sur, A, 1), holds(N cl, A, 2), holds(Reac, A, 2), holds(Acc, A, 3), W et. N cl (inability to change lane) translates as: (6) holds(N cl, A, t) → ¬able(ch lane, A, T )
Expressing that surprise entails a late brake is written as:
(7) holds(Sur, A, t − 1) ∧ holds(Reac, A, t) → holds(ReacL, A, t)
Whether late braking entails or not an accident depends on the ability of the driver to stop the vehicle, i.e.:
(8) holds(ReacL, A, t) → [holds(Acc, A, t + 1) ↔ ¬able(stop, A, t)]
Rule (2) Discussion. In traffic accident examples, the norm-based approach views norms as normative duties. To generalize this approach to domains where norms are only what is normal (as opposed to mandatory), it is necessary to organize these norms in a hierarchy, and to conjecture that the most specific violated norm will be perceived as the cause of an abnormal event. Testing this conjecture requires to gather a reasonably complete set of norms for the domain, which is a hard task. This was achieved in the domain of traffic accidents, and the validation process for this domain is underway. We intuitively determined the causes of the 160 accidents in the corpus, translated the gathered norms in Smodels [17] , and implemented a system translating natural language sentences into the language of the norm-based approach. This system [16] agrees with the researchers' intuitions in 95% of the training sample and 85% of the validation sample. Behavioral experiments are underway to check whether these intuitions are shared by a majority of subjects.
Graphical Models and Interventions
Intervention is a critical route to causation. Ascribing causality becomes easier when experimenting, then observing the effects of the manipulation on the system. Such changes cannot be deduced from a joint probability nor possibility distribution, even fully specified on the variables describing the system. Graphical causal models help make explicit the assumptions needed by allowing inference from interventions as well as observations. A causal Bayesian network is a Bayesian network where directed arcs of the graph are interpreted as elementary causal relations between variables. When there is an influence relation between two variables, intervention allows to determine the causality relation between these variables. In this case, arcs between variables should follow the direction of the causal process. Pearl [2] proposed an approach for handling interventions using causal graphs based on a 'do' operator. Note that causal relations expressed by graphs only concern variables, not complex events. Causal Bayesian networks organize causal knowledge in terms of a few basic mechanisms, each involving a relatively small number of variables. Each intervention entails local change at the level of only one parents-child relation. This section summarizes manipulation methods for handling interventions in possibilistic causal networks. Indeed graphical models are compatible both with a probabilistic and a possibilistic modeling of uncertainty. The possibilistic setting [18] is adopted here. It is more qualitative, and allows us to more easily relate graphical models to nonmonotonic approaches. In fact, the 'do' operator has been first proposed within Spohn's ordinal conditional functions framework which has strong relationships with possibility theory. The parents-child relation at the level of each variable A i is governed by a local possibility distribution Π(A i |U Ai ) where U Ai is the parents set of A i . The joint possibility distribution is computed using the chain rule: π(A 1 , ..., A n ) = ♦ i=1,. ..,n Π(A i |U Ai ), where ♦ is either equal to min or product. An intervention forcing a variable A i to take the value a i is denoted do (A i = a i ) or do(a i ) . This intervention consists of making A i true independently from all its other direct causes (i.e. parents). Graphically, this modification is represented by the deletion of links from U Ai pointing into A i . The resulting graph is said to be mutilated and we have:
e r w i s e
where ω[A i ] = a i means that ω is consistent with A i = a i , and π mut is the joint possibility distribution given by the mutilated graph. Another approach [19] consists in adding a new variable denoted DO Ai as a parent node of A i . DO Ai takes value do Ai−noact when no intervention is observed, and value do ai when an intervention occurs, forcing A i to take value a i (a i belonging to the domain of A i ). The resulting graph is called augmented. In [20] , we showed that the better option to compute the effect of interventions is using augmented graphs, since it allows to reuse existing propagation algorithms without any change.
Example. Let us consider the possibilistic causal network given in Fig. 1 (4) is not explicitly represented but is only derived. Indeed, after propagation of weights we obtain Π(Acc = 0) = 1 > Π(Acc = 1) = α which means that accidents are abnormal.
For binary variables, possibilistic graphical models can encode causality relations as defined by nonmonotonic logic approaches. E |∼ F is interpreted by
This relation satisfies rational monotony in addition to System P, providing more causal relations. Besides, whereas only reported events can be causes as per Definition 1, unreported but strongly plausible events can be causes in the possibilistic frameworks. Lastly, graphical models provide a computational tool for causality ascriptions in presence of interventions. Discussion. Graphical models offer a natural representation of causal relations between elementary events (e.g. variables), thanks to the 'do' operator that models interventions. They can be viewed as complementing or extending nonmonotonic approaches. Indeed, Definition 1 can be naturally extended when reported events include interventions (as illustrated above). A graphical model goes beyond System P without recovering transitivity. It can be used to discriminate between possible causes by considering the most plausible ones, and allows causality ascription in presence of observations and interventions.
Theory of Explanatory Coherence (TEC)
Thagard's theory of explanatory coherence [21] and its connectionist implementation (ECHO) view causal ascriptions as attempts to maximize explanatory coherence between propositions. Although this model did not originate from the AI knowledge representation community, it addresses a similar concern to the other models with have reviewed, and it is as much implementable. In the accident example, maximizing coherence would lead to accept the most plausible hypotheses that explain the accident and reject the alternative hypotheses. If one proposition explains another, then there is a positive constraint between them. Negative constraints result from events that prevent or are inconsistent with other events. Maximizing coherence is generally considered to be computationally intractable. Nevertheless, good approximation algorithms are available, in particular connectionist algorithms such as ECHO. ECHO creates a network of units with explanatory and inhibitory non directional links and then makes inference by spreading activation through the network until all activations have reached stable values. Note that links can be excitatory or inhibitory and units can be positively or negatively activated. When units have settled, the acceptation and rejection of hypotheses depend on whether final activation is positive or negative. Some units can be given priority by linking them positively with a special unit whose activation is kept at 1. A coherence problem is defined as follows [22] . Let E be a finite set of elements {e i } and C be a set of constraints on E understood as a set {(e i , e j )} of pairs of elements of E. C divides into C + , the positive constraints on E, and C − , the negative constraints on E. With each constraint is associated a number w, which is the weight (strength) of the constraint. The problem is to partition E into two sets, A and R, in a way that maximizes compliance with the following two coherence conditions:
Let W be the sum of the weights of the satisfied constraints. The coherence problem is then to partition E into A and R in a way that maximizes W . Let E, C, C + , and C − as defined above. ECHO runs as follows:
For every e i of E, construct a unit u i , a node in a network of units U ; 2. For every positive (negative) constraint in C + (C − ) on elements e i and e j , construct an excitatory (inhibitory) link between the corresponding units u i and u j affected with the same positive (negative) weight. 3. Assign each unit u i an equal initial activation. Update activation of all the units in parallel given current activations and the weights on links [23] 4. When units have settled, hypotheses acceptation and rejection depend on the sign of their final activation. Some units can be given priority by linking them positively with a special unit whose activation is kept at 1.
Example. In Figure 2 each node represents a variable. The three nodes on the left and the W et node correspond to variables with priority; in this case, initial conditions at the beginning of the accident process. Dotted lines represent Discussion. ECHO establishes an ordering between accepted causes, their final activation representing their causal power. It is of particular interest because previous experimental studies [9] have suggested that human distinction between facilitation and genuine causality is based on the strength of the relation between events. Inference in connectionist models like ECHO is not monotonic, not transitive, and can be forward or backward. Although the only central notion is coherence in TEC, questions of abnormality, temporality and intervention can be introduced in order to compute a more powerful causal inference. ECHO can be translated in Pearl's probabilistic networks [24] , and has been used in diverse psychological domains in addition to the computation of causation [25] .
General Discussion
Causality has always been the matter of hot debates. There exists no consensus about its very nature: is it a means by which the human mind makes sense of the world, or an objective property of the world? Is causation intrinsically deterministic, and only our ignorance makes it admissible to approach it by methods devoted to handle uncertain knowledge; or on the opposite, is its relation to uncertainty fundamental? The models we described are agnostic with respect to such debates-and this should be no surprise to the reader, as this paper is not about causation per se, but about how, under practical circumstances, agents prune among a huge number of potential causal factors.
Although the different models start with the same core of variables and pieces of knowledge (1-8), they rely on representation frameworks of different expressive power, and they may exploit additional pieces of knowledge that are not assumed to be available to other models. For example, the norm-based approach relies on a vast set of norms extracted from driving regulations, while for instance the graphical approach relies on probabilistic or possibilistic information. Although this introduces some heterogeneity in the treatment of the example, However, such accurateness would come with a price. Leaving aside the computational cost of ascription itself, a deterministic model is more costly in terms of the acquisition of information that is necessary prior to making any ascription. Furthermore, default, incomplete knowledge is arguably less unrealistic as a model of the kind of knowledge human agents bring to a causal ascription task.
Among the topics that we have not covered, the role of argumentation in causal ascription is worth mentioning. Argumentation is a dynamical process where arguments interact to assess a given claim (here, a causal claim), and processing of causal arguments requires a particular argumentation theory [26] . Agents may argue about where causation takes place in a sequence of events; they may use a weaker notion of causality than, e.g., Def. 2. But agents may also use argumentation in a self-serving way: in the case of a traffic accident, they may attempt to present events in a favorable way; to produce a 'biased description,' that remains respectful of the essential facts, but triggers inferences to conclusions that are in favor of the arguer. For example, one argumentation technique consists in suggesting a causal link between two facts, even if the causation is at best debatable. One typical case is to present the violation of a 'strong' norm as a consequence caused by the adversary's violation of a 'weak' norm, as in the example: 'At the stop sign, the driver on the main road delayed in entering the intersection; I proceeded.' The author wishes to convey that it is normal to overstep a stop sign, in case the vehicle having priority is hesitating. Identifying argumentative strategies may help to get a better understanding of reports, by detecting understatements, and reconstructing what is not explicitly said. In addition, further work will have to compare approaches in terms of their handling of preventative (negative) causation, and of their syntax sensitivity.
